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Comment
In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group:
Sacrificing Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans to
Delinquently Asserted Setoff Rights
Brett Ludwig
In August 1988, De Laurentiis Entertainment Group
(DEG) filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.' Prior to filing, DEG had purchased $1.6 million
worth of advertising from the National Broadcasting Co. (NBC)
through an advertising agency, BBDO Worldwide (BBDO).2 In
a contemporaneous but separate deal, NBC acquired the right
to televise one of DEG's movies for $1.25 million.3 Following
DEG's petition for bankruptcy, NBC asserted a $1.6 million
quantum meruit claim against the bankruptcy estate for the ad-
vertising DEG purchased through BBDO.4 The bankruptcy
court confirmed DEG's reorganization plan in May 1990.5 The
reorganized debtor, now called Carolco Television (Carolco),
subsequently sought the money NBC owed it, and NBC as-
serted a right to setoff its debt to DEG from the debt DEG
owed NBC.6 Even though the confirmed plan did not contain
1. Carolco Television v. National Broadcasting Co. (In re De Laurentiis
Entertainment Group), 963 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct.
330 (1992).
2. Id. BBDO purchased this advertising time from, and signed certain
participating sponsorship agreements with, NBC. Id. Although DEG ap-
proved of the agreements, it was not a direct party to the contract. Id NBC
billed BBDO, and BBDO billed DEG on separate invoices. Id.
3. Id
4. Id. NBC filed a proof of claim against DEG. Id Pursuant to its hold-
ing both a debt to the bankruptcy estate and a potential claim against the es-
tate, NBC claimed a $1.25 million right of setoff against the $1.6 million it was
owed. Id. NBC then sought permission from the bankruptcy judge to pursue
its claim and setoff rights, and the judge converted NBC's quantum meruit
claim into an adversary proceeding before the bankruptcy court. Id.
5. Under this plan most of DEG's assets were purchased by Carolco and
merged with a Carolco subsidiary, renamed Carolco Television, Inc. Id
Under the plan the subsidiary acquired the rights to the $1.25 million claim
against NBC. Id
6. Id.
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provisions concerning NBC's asserted setoff rights, the bank-
ruptcy court allowed NBC's setoff.7 The district court af-
firmed.8 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that confirmation of
DEG's reorganization plan did not destroy NBC's setoff rights.9
In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group raises the issue
of whether a confirmed reorganization plan under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code precludes the subsequent assertion of
setoff rights not included in the plan.'0 The resolution of this
issue materially affects the rights and expectations of both
debtors and creditors in the reorganization process. By under-
mining the finality of the plan, the Ninth Circuit's allowance of
post-confirmation setoffs also significantly reduces the already
slim chances that the debtor will successfully reorganize."
This Comment examines the effect of a confirmed Chapter
11 reorganization plan on setoff rights asserted after the confir-
mation. Part I discusses the policies and purposes underlying
sections 553, 1141, and 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, the doctrine
of res judicata, similar provisions in other Bankruptcy Code
chapters, and judicial resolutions of the issue. Part II analyzes
the Ninth Circuit's holding in In re De Laurentiis Entertain-
ment Group. Part III critiques the Ninth Circuit's analysis and
argues that upholding the right to setoff following the credi-
tor's failure to object at the confirmation hearing is inconsistent
with the text, intent, and general policies of the Bankruptcy
Code. This Comment concludes that creditors seeking to exer-
cise setoff rights should be required to assert their rights prior
to the plan's final confirmation.
I. BANKRUPTCY: CONFIRMED PLANS AND SETOFFS
In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act,12 re-
7. Id. The bankruptcy court granted NBC's motion for summary judg-
ment on its quantum meruit claim. I&
8. Carolco Television v. National Broadcasting Co. (In re De Laurentiis
Entertainment Group), Nos. CV 90 6039 JGD, CV 90 6040 JGD, 1991 WL
340567, at *5 (C.D. Cal. March 5, 1991), aff'd, 963 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 330 (1992).
9. 963 F.2d at 1276, 1278.
10. Id. at 1274.
11. The chances of successfully completing reorganization are low. An
empirical study found that only 26% of debtors who filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 were still operating three years after the study began. Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKIm L.J. 99, 100 (1983). The rest ended up
in the liquidation provisions of Chapter 7. See id, at 106-08.
12. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
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placing the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.I3 The 1978 Bankruptcy
Code (the Code) represents Congress's most recent attempt to
deal with the complex problems arising when the liabilities of
an individual or business exceed its assets.14
Bankruptcy law attempts to facilitate a compromise be-
tween the interests of all creditors and the well-being of the
debtor.15 The Code provides creditors an orderly system for
maximizing collective repayment of all creditors when their to-
tal claims exceed the total value of the debtor's property. 16 At
13. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. The
Constitution delegates bankruptcy powers to the federal government. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. After numerous failed attempts throughout the nine-
teenth century, Congress finally enacted the first "permanent" act governing
bankruptcies in 1898. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LnurTs OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAW 1 (1986); see also CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNrrED
STATES HISTORY 3-159 (1935) (summarizing the complex history of the at-
tempts to create federal bankruptcy law prior to 1898).
14. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAw OF DEBTORS
AND CREDrroRS 187-92 (2d ed. 1991).
15. This basic principle is shared by both leading schools of bankruptcy
theory: The "traditional" school, represented by Professor Elizabeth Warren
of the University of Texas School of Law, and the "collectivist" school, repre-
sented by Professors Douglas G. Baird of the University of Chicago and
Thomas H. Jackson of the University of Virginia Law School. See JACKSON,
supra note 13, at 4; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cim. L. REV.
775, 785 (1987); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied
Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy,
85 Nw. U. L. REv. 919, 949-60 (1988).
The collectivist school views bankruptcy as existing primarily to further
the fair distribution of the bankrupt debtor's estate among its creditors, and as
a collective debt collection device. See JACKSON, supra note 13, at 5-6. As
such, Baird and Jackson see limits on the way bankruptcy should disrupt the
non-bankruptcy rights and priorities of creditors. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U.
Cm. L. REV. 815, 822 (1987).
Warren's traditional school believes in extending the view of bankruptcy
beyond the rights and interests of creditors and debtors. She sees creditors'
interests in bankruptcy as competing with several other societal interests.
Warren, supra, at 788.
16. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 8-18. The common characterization of the
problem a normal individual creditor's remedies scheme creates is that of the
"common pool." Id A bankrupt debtor generally owes a group of creditors in
a legally created line of priority, yet lacks the funds fully to pay all claims. Id.
If each creditor acts in her individual self-interest, the tendency of those first
in line is to drain the "common pool" of the debtor's assets, leaving subsequent
creditors with little or nothing, and ruining any prospect for working out the
problem with the debtor. Id. Bankruptcy strives for equal treatment of credi-
tors and for maximization of repayment through collective action. I&.; see also
James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law:
1993]
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the same time, the Code accords the debtor a fresh start 17 by
providing an automatic stay to shield the debtor from actions
by its creditors,' 8 and by allowing either a reorganization 19 or a
discharge of indebtedness, 20 or both.
A. CHAPTER 11
Chapter 11 of the Code provides for debt reorganization, 21
primarily for businesses.22 The 1978 Code instituted major
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 2097, 2101 (1990) (explaining the general goal of equality in bankruptcy).
17. Bankruptcy provides the debtor with a "fresh start" by removing the
oppressive burden of heavy indebtedness. The Code thus ameliorates the diffi-
culties of saving the troubled business of an honest, but unfortunate, debtor by
relieving the debtor of the additional strain of heavy indebtedness caused by
past misfortune. See JACKSON, supra note 13, at 225-28.
18. Filing a petition for bankruptcy under the Code automatically triggers
a stay of all efforts to collect debts from the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
This "automatic stay" functions much like an injunction preventing any action
against the debtor unless the bankruptcy court first grants permission pursu-
ant to § 362. See ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY
22-23 (1985). The purpose of the automatic stay is to insure the advantages of
collective action of bankruptcy by preventing individuals from acting indepen-
dently to drain the common pool. It thus shuts the door on the debtor's estate,
locking the debtor's property in and keeping creditors out. See JACKSON,
supra note 13, at 151-52.
19. Three chapters of the Code provide for reorganization. Chapter 13 al-
lows individual consumers to reorganize their debts. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1330 (1988). Chapter 12 provides for family farm reorganizations. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1988). Chapter 11 governs reorganization of businesses
and individuals with very large debts. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
20. Discharge applies to several sections of the bankruptcy code. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1228, 1328 (1988). Discharge generally precludes actions to
enforce the debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
21. Reorganization bankruptcy under Chapter 11 thus differs from liqui-
dation bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Under a liquidation bankruptcy, the
debtor's property is sold and the proceeds are used to pay groups of creditors.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 775, 775 (1988). Chapter 11 allows businesses to avoid liquidation, re-
tain their property, and continue in business in the hope of capturing a greater
value than would be received in a liquidation. Id. at 776. Debt reorganization
usually entails exchanging claims against the old debtor for claims against, or
interests in, the newly reorganized entity, enabling the business to continue
operations. Md. Under Chapter 11, reorganization requires, among other
things, that creditors receive at least as much in the reorganization as they
would in an immediate Chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988).
22. While individuals also can file for reorganization under Chapter 11,
Chapter 13 generally provides a more economically rational option for individ-
uals, unless their debt is greater than the maximum prescribed for Chapter 13.
Therefore, only in the rare cases where individuals have accumulated huge
debts does Chapter 11 apply to non-business entities. WARREN & WESTBROOK,
supra note 14, at 427; see 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
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changes in business reorganization under Chapter 11.2 Chap-
ter 11 provides a struggling business a breathing space through
the automatic stay,24 and a chance for reorganization and dis-
charge of indebtedness,25 while providing creditors with the
protection and benefit of collective action.26 Repayment occurs
as a result of plans that restructure indebtedness within the
Code's prescribed limitations.27 The bankruptcy court adminis-
ters the reorganization process by conducting hearings at which
interested parties may object to the proposed plan,28 and by
overseeing the implementation of confirmed plans.29
23. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 429. Congress intended to
encourage earlier attempts at reorganization under the new Code than had oc-
curred under the old Bankruptcy Act. Id The hope was that if companies
restructured earlier more businesses could be saved from eventual failure. Id
at 428-29.
24. In Chapter 11, the automatic stay offers the business a respite from
hounding creditors while it formulates a reorganization plan. See Robin E.
Phelan & Susan L. S. Ernst, Soloman's Capitulation;- The Automatic Stay, Ad-
equate Protection, and Use of Collateral, in 1 LENDING TRANSACTIONS AND THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT 1986, at 191, 199 (PLI Com. Law and Prac. Course Hand-
book Series No. 374, 1986).
25. Unlike Chapter 13 reorganizations, the confirmation of a Chapter 11
reorganization plan provides immediate discharge of debts except as provided
for in the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988). Under Chapter 13, discharge does not
occur until completion of the reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988).
26. Creditors benefit from acting as a group and thus prevent draining of
the common pool. See JACKSON, supra note 13, at 8-18.
27. Under Chapter 11, a reorganization plan must meet the criteria of
§ 1129. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988). A creditor is protected if its claim is impaired
by the requirements of an acceptable plan. Unless the impaired creditor ac-
cepts the plan, the plan must meet both the absolute priority rule and the best
interests test. The absolute priority rule requires that for the claims of a class
of creditors to be impaired by a reorganization plan, all classes below that class
must receive nothing. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)-(2). The best interests test
requires that each creditor under the plan receive an amount equal to at least
the present value of its claim in an immediate liquidation. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(7); see also WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 427-28 (explain-
ing general restructuring of debts); JACKSON, supra note 13, at 68-88 (describ-
ing the debtor's powers to affect creditors' claims in bankruptcy).
28. Section 1128 provides that the court shall hold a hearing on the confir-
mation plan and permits interested parties to object to confirmation. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1128 (1988). The hearing protects due process rights of creditors who might
otherwise be deprived of property rights without notice and an opportunity to
respond. One court has held that absent notice and an opportunity to voice
objections to the reorganization plan, confirmation violated a creditor's due
process rights. Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620, 622 (10th
Cir. 1984).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988). In order to be confirmed by the bankruptcy
court, the bankruptcy judge must find that the plan meets the extensive re-
quirements of § 1129, which insure fair treatment of all classes of creditors and
the success of the plan. See id
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Chapter 11 has come under increasing fire for its lack of ef-
fectiveness.30 The vast majority of businesses filing under
Chapter 11 never successfully complete the reorganization pro-
cess and suffer liquidation.31 Critics even suggest abandoning
Chapter 11 because the costs of failed attempts to reorganize
outweigh any benefits provided.32
B. CONFIRMATION AND DISCHARGE
Sections 1141 and 524 of the Code provide for the confirma-
tion of a reorganization plan and the discharge of underlying
debts under Chapter 11, and serve res judicata policy by binding
all parties with a final judgment. Section 1141(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides that confirmation of a Chapter 11 reor-
ganization plan binds both the debtor and the creditor.33
Sections 1141(b) and 1141(c) provide that following confirma-
tion, a Chapter 11 plan vests all the property of the bankruptcy
estate in the debtor clear of all claims and interests of creditors
except as the plan provides.3 4 Most importantly, confirmation
discharges most types of debts.35 Thus the confirmation of a
plan solidifies the debtor's and creditors' respective positions,36
30. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations,
15 J. LEGAL STuD. 127, 128 (1986); Bebchuk, supra note 21, at 779-80; Bowers,
supra note 16, at 2098.
31. LoPucki, supra note 11, at 100.
32. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 13, at 218-24.
33. Section 1141 provides in part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this
section, the provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor... and
any creditor... whether or not the claim or interest of such creditor
is impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor...
has accepted the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
34. Section 1141 further provides:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order con-
firming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property
of the estate in the debtor.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this
section and except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order
confirming the plan, after conJirmation of a plan, the property dealt
with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of credi-
tors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(b)-(c) (1988) (emphasis added). The legislative history of
§ 1141 states that the Congress intended to discharge all debts that arose
before the date of the order for relief unless the plan or the order confirming
the plan specifically provides otherwise. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
129 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5915.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1988). Section 524 governs discharge under
§ 1141. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (1988).
36. Courts have noted the importance of confirmation as a source of final-
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and provides general stability to the reorganization.3 The plan
creates a framework on which both the creditors and the
debtor in possession, or trustee in bankruptcy, can rely and
plan their behavior.3 8
By discharging the debts of the reorganizing debtor, the
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan prevents further actions by
creditors concerning those debts.3 9 Section 524 of the Code ex-
pressly provides that discharge voids any judgment of personal
liability of the debtor discharged in bankruptcy and enjoins at-
tempts to offset any such debt.40 Significantly, this provision
explicitly applies to prevent attempts to "offset," or set off, on
the basis of a discharged debt.4 ' Thus the combined effect of
sections 1141 and 524 is to bind parties with a final judgment,
providing a res judicata effect to the bankruptcy proceeding.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment
on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigat-
ing issues that were or could have been raised in that action.4
ity to the bankruptcy proceeding. See, e.g., In re Blanton Smith Corp., 81 B.R.
440, 442 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (holding that confirmed plans are final judgments
binding all parties); Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech Research (In re Arctic Enters.),
68 B.R. 71, 80 (D. Minn. 1986) (noting that debtors and creditors naturally look
to the confirmed plan as the final decree determining the rights of all parties
involved).
37. See In re Henderberg, 108 B.R. 407, 415-16 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding that to allow change after confirmation would disrupt the situation
and violate basic principles of contract and bankruptcy law which favor "fair-
ness, certainty and finality").
38. See Astroglass Boat Co. v. Eldridge (In re Astroglass Boat Co.), 32
B.R. 538, 543 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983). The court emphasized the importance
of the finality of the confirmation order in allowing the infusion of new capital
which is vital to the very success of any reorganization under Chapter 11. Id.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
40. Section 524 provides in part:
(a) A discharge in a case under this title-
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that
such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the
debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944,
1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt
is waived.
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (1988).
41. Section 524 further provides that a discharge "operates as an injunc-
tion against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment
of process, or an ac; to collec recover or offset any such debt as a personal
liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived." Id. §
524(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). The legislative history behind § 524 reveals
that Congress intended to "eliminate any doubt concerning the effect of the
discharge as a total prohibition on debt collection efforts." S. RFP. No. 989,
supra note 34, at 80, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5866.
42. Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).
1993]
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The doctrine avoids relitigation of issues, insures the finality of
judicial decisions, and, most importantly, requires interested
parties to assert related claims in that same action.43
The policies of certainty and reliance underlying res judi-
cata are particularly important in the Chapter 11 context. The
infusion of additional capital, vital to most reorganization at-
tempts, is jeopardized if lenders cannot be sure of the finality of
the debtor's situation following confirmation." Thus courts
have held that confirmation of a plan and discharge of indebt-
edness without contest and appeal result in a res judicata ef-
fect.4 5 Also, courts have held that creditors who had notice of a
confirmation hearing but who failed to object to the reorganiza-
tion plan at the hearing are subsequently bound by the plan,
46
even if the bankruptcy court discharged debts that should not
have been discharged under the Code.47
C. SETOFF
In bankruptcy, setoff permits a creditor to subtract, or "set
off," a debt that it owes the bankrupt debtor from the debt that
43. Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 201 (1932). Judgments that are not di-
rectly appealed are deemed conclusively decided. I& This is true even if the
judgment was based on an erroneous view of law, in order to provide certainty
and to create a conclusive character in judgments. I& By precluding relitiga-
tion of claims that could have been asserted, res judicata also requires inter-
ested parties to raise those claims in the initial proceeding. Moitie, 452 U.S. at
398.
44. See Astroglass Boat Co. v. Eldridge (In re Astroglass Boat Co.), 32
B.R. 538, 543 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983). The success of a struggling business's
reorganization requires the execution of new contracts and loan agreements to
infuse the new capital required by the reorganizing business. I& at 543-44. If
the order of confirmation is not given the full effect of a final judgment as to
the reorganized debtor, the infusion of capital is jeopardized. Id- at 544. With-
out this capital, the chance of a successful reorganization, which is the primary
goal of Chapter 11, is greatly diminished. I& at 543.
45. See In re Henderberg, 108 B.R. 407, 411-14 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989)
(plan confirmed under § 1141 precluded later contesting of priority of claims
paid in plan); In re Blanton Smith Corp., 81 B.R. 440, 443 (M.D. Tenn. 1987)
(Chapter 11 plan confirmed pursuant to § 1141 was given res judicata effect
even if based on an erroneous interpretation of law); Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech
Research (In re Arctic Enters.), 68 B.R. 71, 79-80 (D. Minn. 1986) (confirmed
Chapter 11 plan precluded lien which was not included in the plan).
46. By failing to object at the hearing, creditors waive their right to object
to the reorganization plan. See Republic Supply Co. v. Shoal, 815 F.2d 1046,
1049-50 (5th Cir. 1987); Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705
F.2d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1983); Henderberg, 108 B.R. at 415; Blanton Smith, 81
B.R. at 442; Minstar, 68 B.R. at 80.
47. See Republic Supply Co., 815 F.2d at 1049-50 (explaining the result of
failing to appeal a confirmation order).
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the debtor owes the creditor.48 Thus setoff benefits the credi-
tor by allowing it to apply to its own claim the funds that it
owes the bankrupt, which would otherwise go to the bank-
ruptcy estate for division among all creditors. Consequently,
the creditor is able to increase its priority of repayment in rela-
tion to other creditors.49 The policy behind setoff is one of eq-
uity and fairness, and setoff historically has been viewed as
permissive and within the equitable judgment of the court.5°
The current Bankruptcy Code recognizes the doctrine of
setoff in section 553.51 Section 553 states that the Code gener-
ally does not affect any right of setoff.52 While the Code pro-
vides rules for when to apply setoff, it does not define
"setoff."53 Courts, therefore, have looked to general historical
48. 4 COLIER ON BANKRUPrCY 553.02 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1992).
49. 1& This is an exception to the general rule in bankruptcy which pros-
cribes equality of treatment for creditors in the same class. See Robert L.
Ordin, Setoffs Under the Bankruptcy Code, in 1 LENDING TRANSACTIONS AND
THE BANKRUPTCY AcT 1986, supra note 24, at 519, 564.
50. See Ordin, supra note 49, at 564.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The Code basically re-enacted
previous rules concerning setoffs found under the old bankruptcy act of 1898
with only minor changes. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, 553.01.
52. Section 553(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections
362 and 363 of this title, this title does not affect any right of a credi-
tor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a
claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The legislative history be-
hind § 553 states that Congress intended to preserve the right of setoff as it
existed under § 68 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. S. REP. No. 989, supra note
34, at 91, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5877-78. Section 68 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 provided:
Set-Offs and Counterclaims.
a. In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the es-
tate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one
debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance only shall be
allowed or paid.
b. A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any
debtor of the bankrupt which (1) is not provable against the estate; or(2) was purchased by or transferred to him after the filing of the peti-
tion, or within four months before such filing, with a view to such use
and with knowledge or notice that such bankrupt was insolvent, or
had committed an act of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 68, 30 Stat. 544, 565 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
Congress adopted § 553 to establish a two-prong test of when setoff was
applicable and to continue preventing the acquisition of claims by creditors for
1993]
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principles of legal and equitable setoff in defining the doc-
trine.5 A significant attribute of the Code's treatment of setoff
is the discretion granted judges to weigh the equities before
granting setoff in individual cases.55
D. CoNFIcTs BETWEEN SETOFF AND CONFIRMATION
Both section 553's right to setoff and section 1141's finality
of confirmation are written in absolute terms. 6 While section
553 states that the right to a setoff is never destroyed in bank-
ruptcy except in certain enumerated circumstances,5 7 section
1141 states that when a plan is confirmed, all property of the
estate is transferred to the debtor in possession or trustee in
bankruptcy free from any obligations or liens.58 The two provi-
sions therefore conflict when both sections operate in a single
case. 59
the purpose of conducting setoff. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 34, at 91, re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5877-78. Creditors often seek setoff "prefer-
ences," the acquisition of setoff rights, to increase their standing in relation to
other creditors also waiting in line before the common pool.
54. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, 553.02; see United States
ex rel. IRS v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767, 772 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting the necessity of
looking to common law and equitable principles when dealing with setoff);
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 B.R. 20, 25-26 (D.
Colo. 1986) (same); Lessig Constr. v. Schnabel Assoc. (In re Lessig Constr.), 67
B.R. 436, 441 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (same).
55. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy, supra note 48, 553.02.
56. Section 553 states in pertinent part that "this title does not affect any
right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt." 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1988 & Supp.
III 1991) (emphasis added). Section 1141's absolute language provides that "af-
ter confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear
of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general
partners in the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
57. Section 553 provides for two enumerated exceptions to the right to set-
off. First, setoffs are not granted where the creditor's claim is not allowed in
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Second, setoffs are
not granted where the creditor acquires a debt owed to the debtor immediately
prior to the bankruptcy or for the specific purpose of achieving setoff. 11
U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). This is called a "setoff preference,"
because the creditor has tried to receive preferential treatment over other
creditors in anticipation of bankruptcy. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra
note 14, at 537-38. Also, any increase in preexisting setoff rights during the 90
days preceding bankruptcy may be voided by the debtor in possession. 11
U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b)-(c) (1988).
59. The legislative history does not indicate that the drafters recognized
the conflict. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 34, at 91, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5877-78. This lack of legislative history addressing the sharp
textual conflict suggests that Congress did not foresee situations in which
§ 553 and § 1141 would conflict.
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Courts have yet to decide conclusively which provision con-
trols in cases where both sections are operative. In In re New-
port Offshore, the bankruptcy court found that sections 1141
and 524 controlled.6 0 It held that confirmation of the reorgani-
zation plan had a res judicata effect with respect to the credi-
tor's setoff, in part because the creditor failed to assert its setoff
rights in a timely fashion at the confirmation hearing.61 Other
courts have also disallowed setoff if the creditor failed to assert
its rights at the confirmation hearing.62
At least one court has taken a contrary position regarding
the effect of confirmation upon section 553 setoff rights. The
In re Slaw court held that section 553 prevailed despite confir-
mation because of the setoff provision's absolute language and
its limited enumerated exceptions.6 3 The court also perceived
potential equitable problems if it allowed debtors to evade set-
off by seeking repayment from creditors post-confirmation. 64
E. CoNFLICTs BETWEEN SETOFF AND DISCHARGE
Conflicts between the right to setoff under section 553 and
the confirmation of a debtor's plan also occur in Bankruptcy
Code Chapters 13, 12, and 7. In individual consumer reorgani-
zation situations under Chapter 13, plans are confirmed pursu-
ant to section 1325.65 Once the plans are completed the
60. 86 B.R. 325, 326 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1988). The Army sought to set off
funds owed by the debtor to the Navy against its debt to the debtor. I& The
court ruled that the Army had ample opportunity to object to the reorganiza-
tion plan, and that by remaining idle it had forfeited its right to setoff. I&
61. Id-
62. See, e.g., In re Charter Co., 103 B.R. 302, 305 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding
that because the creditor did not seek bankruptcy court approval for its setoff
prior to confirmation, it waived any setoff rights), rev'd on other grounds, 913
F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Crabtree, 76 B.R. 208, 210 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1987) ("It cannot be gainsaid that a creditor whose prepetition claim is allowed
and was not dealt with by the confirmed Plan of Reorganization should not
have a right to a setoff.").
63. Slaw Constr. Corp. v. Hughes Foulkrod Constr. Co. (In re Slaw Con-
str. Corp.), 17 B.R. 744, 748 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (§ 553 setoff rights could not
be extinguished even by confirmation).
64. Id. The judge feared that debtors would use confirmation and dis-
charge to cheat creditors out of setoff rights by not pursuing their claims
against the creditor until after confirmation. Id- A cautious creditor could
prevent this danger by objecting to the confirmation of any plan which did not
provide for the contingent claim.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988). Section 1327 provides:
(a) The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each
creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by
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underlying debts are discharged under section 1328.6 Section
524 governs the effect of discharge under section 1328 as well as
that under Chapter 11.67 Chapter 13, therefore, is similar in
structure to Chapter 11 and provides for similar results upon
confirmation.
In the Chapter 13 arena, courts have split on the issue of
whether confirmation takes precedence over setoff rights. Sev-
eral courts have held that confirmation prevails over subse-
quently asserted setoff rights.68 The general approach, as in
the Chapter 11 context, looks to the equities of the situation
and bars the creditor from asserting post-confirmation setoffs
where the creditor failed either to assert its rights prior to con-
firmation 9 or to object to the plan at the confirmation
hearing.70
the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has ac-
cepted, or has rejected the plan.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order con-
firming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all property of the
estate in the debtor.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order con-
firming the plan, the property vesting in the debtor under subsection
(b) of this section is free and clear of any claim or interest of any
creditor provided for by the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1327 (1988).
Thus the language of § 1327 closely parallels that of § 1141. Both contain
the same three sections performing essentially identical functions. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1141, 1327 (1988). The effect of confirmation under Chapter 13 is
therefore analogous with that under Chapter 11. The main difference is that
Chapter 13 does not discharge debts until the plan is completed, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328 (1988), whereas discharge occurs immediately after confirmation under
Chapter 11, see 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
68. See, e.g., United States ex reL IRS v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767, 774 (3d Cir.
1983) (finding that the IRS's delinquency in not objecting to plan at confirma-
tion barred it from asserting setoff); Edelsberg v. Thompson McKinnen Sec.
(In re Edelsberg), 101 B.R. 386, 390 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that the
confirmed plan is res judicata and subject to attack only in limited ways); In re
Warden 36 B.R. 968, 972 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (holding that un-asserted setoff
rights were lost on confirmation); In re Alexander, 31 B.R. 389, 391 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding that confirmation of Chapter 13 plan barred § 533
setoff rights); In re Hackney, 20 B.R. 158, 159 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982) (finding
that creditor was bound to the payment provided for in the plan and could not
assert setoff not provided for in the plan); In re Holcomb, 18 B.R. 839, 841
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that the failure to exercise setoff prior to
confirmation barred post-confirmation setoff).
69. See Norton, 717 F.2d at 774; Edelsberg, 101 B.R. at 390; Warden, 36
B.R. at 972; Alexander, 31 B.R. at 391.
70. See Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118,
1123 (9th Cir. 1983); Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1049-50 (5th
Cir. 1977); In re Henderberg, 108 B.R. 407, 415 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In re
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Other courts deciding Chapter 13 cases reached the oppo-
site conclusion. One court largely followed the absolute terms
of section 553's language in granting setoff.71 It concluded set-
off must prevail because confirmation is not one of the enumer-
ated exceptions to the right of setoff.72 Courts holding setoff
superior to confirmation in the Chapter 13 setting also looked
to equitable principles in each case that warranted finding cred-
itors' setoff rights superior to the finality of confirmation.73
Chapter 12 of the Code, governing farm reorganizations,
also contains confirmation provisions that have led to conflicts
over post-petition setoff rights.74 Under Chapter 12, plans for
the reorganization of family farms are confirmed and thereaf-
ter bind the parties. 75 Following confirmation the debts are
discharged.76 Two cases under Chapter 12 have dealt with this
scenario, finding that confirmation overrode any attempt at a
Blanton Smith Corp., 81 B.R. 440, 442 (M.D. Tenn. 1987); Minstar, Inc. v. Plas-
tech Research (In re Arctic Enters.), 68 B.R. 71, 80 (D. Minn. 1986).
71. See United States ex rel IRS v. Orlinski (In re Orlinski), 140 B.R. 600,
603 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991).
72. IHi at 603-04.
73. See, e.g., i&i at 604 (holding that allowing setoff would not prejudice
other creditors and would not impede debtor's reorganization); United States
ex reL. IRS v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 136 B.R. 306, 307-09 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1991) (holding that tax code provisions concerning setoff tipped balance in
favor of allowing setoff).
74. See, e.g., In re Butz, 104 B.R. 128, 131-32 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1989) (dis-
allowing setoff rights asserted after confirmation); In re Stephenson, 84 B.R.
74, 77-79 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding confirmation trumped the late as-
sertion of setoff).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 1227 (1988). Section 1227 provides:
(a) Except as provided in section 1288(a) of this title, the provi-
sions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, each creditor, each equity
security holder, and each general partner in the debtor, whether or
not the claim of such creditor, such equity security holder, or such
general partner in the debtor has objected to, has accepted, or has re-
jected the plan.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order con-
firming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property
of the estate in the debtor.
(c) Except as provided in section 1228(a) of this title and except
as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan,
the property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section
is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for
by the plan.
Id These provisions also closely parallel the language of § 1141, containing
the same three subdivisions with virtually identical language. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141 (1988).
76. Under Chapter 12, as in Chapter 11, debts are discharged immediately
after confirmation rather than after completion of the plan as in Chapter 13.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a) (1988).
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post-confirmation setoff.77 The courts' rationale rested largely
on the equities of effectuating the purposes of farm reorganiza-
tion and the creditor's failure to assert timely its setoff rights.78
A final analogous situation involving conflicts between set-
off and discharge concerns liquidation bankruptcies under
Chapter 7.79 Under Chapter 7 the debtor's property is liqui-
dated, creditors are paid from the proceeds, and the debtor re-
ceives a discharge from all debts.8 0 Although no plan is
confirmed,8 ' discharge under Chapter 7 is governed by section
524, the same section that delineates the effect of discharge
under 1141, 1228, and 1328.82
The courts also disagree on the effect of discharge on pre-
petition setoff rights in Chapter 7 cases.8 3 Several courts fa-
vored setoff, because of the danger of denying due process to
creditors who may lose their claims without notice.84 Other
courts, however, held discharge superior to setoff rights by
twisting the language to avoid conflict,8 5 or by considering the
equities of the individual cases and the nature of setoff
doctrine.8 6
Bankruptcy Code Chapters 13, 12, and 7 contain conflicting
language regarding confirmation and discharge and their effects
on unasserted setoff rights. Most courts favor confirmation and
discharge over creditors' attempts to assert setoffs late in the
process. Especially where the Code requires reorganization
plans and confirmation hearings, the majority of courts do not
allow creditors who failed to object to the plan during the hear-
77. See Butz, 104 B.R. at 131-32; Stephenson, 84 B.R. at 77-79.
78. See, e.g., Stephenson, 84 B.R. at 79.
79. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
81. Unlike Chapters 11, 12, and 13, Chapter 7 does not involve a reorgani-
zation; consequently there is no reorganization plan.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
83. See, e.g., Camelback Hosp. v. Buckenmaier (In re Buckenmaier), 127
B.R. 233, 237 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (holding that valid setoff cannot be de-
feated by discharge); Davidovich v. Welton (In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533,
1539 (10th Cir. 1990) (allowing setoff); Dezarn v. First Farmers Bank (In re
Dezarn), 96 B.R. 93, 95 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1988) (holding discharge trumps set-
off); Johnson v. Rutherford Hosp. (In re Johnson), 13 B.R. 185, 189 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1985) (finding discharge defeated setoff attempt); Krajci v. Mount
Vernon Consumer Discount Co., 16 B.R. 464, 466-67 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (upholding
setoff rights even after discharge).
84. See, e.g., Buckenmaier, 127 B.R. at 237; Davidovich, 901 F.2d at 1539;
Krajci, 16 B.R. at 466-67.
85. See Johnson, 13 B.R. at 189.
86. Dezarn, 96 B.R. at 95 (holding discharge trumps setoff); Johnson, 13
B.R. at 189 (finding discharge defeated setoff attempt).
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ing subsequently to assert setoff rights not accounted for in the
plan.
II. IN RE DE LAURENTIIS ENTERTAINMENT GROUP:
ALLOWING SETOFF DESPITE CONFIRMATION
In In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group, DEG sought
reorganization under the provisions of Chapter 11.87 In accord-
ance with the Bankruptcy Code, DEG developed a reorganiza-
tion plan8 8 that the bankruptcy court confirmed pursuant to
section 1141,89 and its debts accordingly were discharged.9
NBC, after failing to object to the reorganization plan at the
confirmation hearing,91 subsequently sought to assert its right
to setoff under section 553 as a defense to the payment of a
debt claimed against it by the newly reorganized debtor,
Carolco.92 The result was a conflict between the setoff provi-
sion of section 553 and the confirmation and discharge provi-
sions of sections 1141 and 524.93
The district court ruled in favor of NBC.9 4 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit confronted the issue of whether section 553 rights
to setoff trumped sections 524 and 1141.95 It affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court and held that NBC's setoff rights
could not be extinguished, even by confirmation of the reorgan-
ization plan.9
87. 963 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1992).
88. Id. Reorganization plans are governed by § 1129. 11 U.S.C. § 1129
(1988).
89. 963 F.2d at 1271.
90. Id The effects of discharge are delineated in § 524. 11 U.S.C. § 524
(1988).
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (1988).
92. 963 F.2d at 1271. It is unclear why NBC asserted a claim against the
bankruptcy estate at all. NBC possessed a valid contractual claim against the
advertising agency BBDO. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Ordina-
rily one would expect NBC to assert its claim against BBDO and allow BBDO
to worry about its claim against DEG. One probable explanation is that NBC
tried to insure the payment of at least most of the debt at stake. Even with a
reorganization, the debt is at risk of never being paid off in full. As the pos-
sessor of DEG's claim for $1.25 million purchase, NBC could insure repayment
of most of the advertising debt through the mechanism of setoff. Perhaps
BBDO was in danger of bankruptcy if DEG did not pay its debt in full. In that
event, NBC may have hoped to maximize its chances for repayment by using
the mechanism of setoff and preventing DEG's bankruptcy from causing the
nonpayment and bankruptcy of BBDO and subsequent nonpayment of NBC.
93. 963 F.2d at 1274.
94. Id. at 1271.
95. Id. at 1278.
96. Id- at 1276-77.
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The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of this issue9 by ad-
mitting the harsh textual conflict and impossibility of finding
superiority simply by looking to the Code's language.9 8 The
court noted, however, that the list of exceptions to setoff rights
enumerated in section 553 did not contain an exception for con-
firmation.99 The court reasoned that because discharge was not
a specified exception in the Code,10 0 and because the wording of
section 553 was absolute,' 10 setoff must trump confirmation and
discharge.10 2
The court also noted precedents dealing with the conflict
between the two sections. Citing two Chapter 11 cases10 3 that
resolved the conflict in favor of confirmation,' ° 4 the court
disagreed with their brief reasoning. 0 5 The court also noted
potential equitable characteristics distinguishing the
precedents. 10 6
The Ninth Circuit then turned to three lines of analogous
cases.' 0 7 The court noted that several cases under the provi-
sions of Chapter 13, which also involved confirmation of a reor-
ganization plan, did not allow late assertion of setoff rights. 0 8
97. The court first considered a separate issue concerning the validity of
NBC's quantum meruit claim against DEG. Id at 1272-74. NBC successfully
contended that California law did not require DEG to have an expectation of
repayment by NBC in order to establish a valid quantum meruit claim. Id at
1273.
98. Id. at 1274.
99. Id at 1276-77; see 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b)-(c) (1988).
100. 963 F.2d at 1274; see 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
161. 963 F.2d at 1276.
102. Id at 1276-77.
103. The Ninth Circuit also cited another Chapter 11 case, Slaw Constr.
Corp. v. Hughes Foulkrod Constr. Co. (In re Slaw Constr. Corp.), 17 B.R. 744
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982), but incorrectly classified it as a Chapter 7 case. See 963
F.2d at 1276. The misclassification stems from the court's misconception that
§ 524 only applies to Chapter 7 cases. I& The court recounted the provisions
of § 524(a)(2), noting that the textual conflict between § 524 and § 553 is even
greater than the conflict that it faced. Id at 1276 n.14. The court did not real-
ize that § 524 was applicable in the DEG Chapter 11 case.
104. Service Decorating Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re Service Decorating
Co.), 105 B.R. 859, 862 (N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Newport Offshore, 86 B.R. 325, 326
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1988).
105. 963 F.2d at 1275.
106. Id.
107. The court stated that it is used four lines of analogous cases, but sub-
sequently only provided analogies with Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and cases under
the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See id. at 1275-76.
108. Id- at 1275 (citing United States ex reL IRS v. Norton (In re Norton),
717 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1983); In re Hackney, 20 B.R. 158 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982);
In re Holcomb, 18 B.R. 839 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982)).
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The court also examined Chapter 7 cases involving the conflict
between setoff rights and discharge under section 524 and
found that a majority of these cases subordinated discharge to
setoff rights.10 9 Finally, the court considered provisions under
the old Bankruptcy Act involving a similar problem."0 Noting
the close tracking of the provisions, the court stated that deci-
sions under the Bankruptcy Act suggested that section 553 set-
off rights should predominate over confirmation and
discharge."'
The Ninth Circuit also considered policy arguments in sup-
port of its conclusion to allow NBC's setoff rights. The court
first noted that disallowing setoff rights in this case would
emasculate the language of section 553, making it superflu-
ous.1 2 The court determined that, historically, judicial inter-
pretation of the Code favored setoff rights and granted them
liberally." 3 Denying setoff rights to NBC would be contrary to
the history of setoffs in bankruptcy law." 4
The court further reasoned that denying setoff rights fol-
lowing confirmation would be inequitable to creditors who
would have to pay their obligation to the debtor in full, while
facing the possibility of only partial repayment of their debts
from the debtor." 5 The court concluded that nullification of
NBC's setoff rights would be unfair because NBC diligently
pursued its case before the bankruptcy court." 6
III. WHY SETOFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED AFTER
CONFIRMATION IN CHAPTER 11
A. TEXTUAL INTErPRETATION
The court's textual analysis holding section 553 setoff
rights superior to section 1141 rested on an incorrect reading of
109. IAL at 1275-76 (citing Camelback Hosp. v. Buckenmaier (In re Buck-
enmaier), 127 B.R. 233 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991); Davidovich v. Welton (In re
Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1990); Krajci v. Mount Vernon Consumer
Discount Co., 16 B.R. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
110. I& at 1276 (citing Record Club of Am. v. United Artists Records, 80
B.R. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (allowing setoff in § 68 reorganization); In re Reading
Co., 72 B.R. 293 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (allowing setoff in § 77 railroad
reorganization)).
111. Id-
112. Id. at 1277.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1277-78.
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the Bankruptcy Code. The court first identified the conflicting
absolute wording contained in sections 1141 and 553.117 The
court, however, then reached the faulty conclusion that Con-
gress's failure to place confirmation in section 553's enumerated
exceptions to setoff"- 8 illustrated that Congress intended to
grant setoffs superiority over confirmation and discharge." 9
The Ninth Circuit's textual analysis improperly stretches
the meaning of the Code. Section 1141 and section 524 also
have enumerated exceptions to confirmation and discharge.12O
Section 1141 does not include setoffs as an exception to the ef-
fects of confirmation.' 2 ' Nor is setoff one of the specified ex-
ceptions to discharge. 122 Consequently, the same reasoning
concerning enumerated exceptions the court used to find sec-
tion 553 superiority also provides an argument for section 1141
and section 524 preeminence.
The legislative history of section 553 does not support the
conclusion that Congress intended to subordinate confirmation
and discharge to setoff. Instead, the legislative history illus-
trates Congress merely intended to include setoff doctrine in
the new Code. Nothing supports the argument that Congress
wrote the provisions of section 553 with intent to supersede all
other sections. Further, the legislative history explaining the
exceptions to discharge shows that the primary focus of Con-
gress was to attack setoff -"preferences." Thus, the limited
scope of the enumerated exceptions to section 553 was the re-
sult of an intent to deal with the specific problem of setoff pref-
erences, and is not indicative of a broad congressional purpose
regarding the predominance of setoff rights.
A careful textual reading of all three applicable sections
supports the conclusion that confirmation and discharge should
trump setoff rights. Section 1141(c) provides that once a plan is
confirmed, all property of the debtor is free and clear of all
creditors' claims and interests except as provided in the plan.123
By discharging the debtor's debts, 1141 triggers section 524,
which explicitly prevents creditors from attempting to offset
against property of the debtor, unless the reorganization plan
117. These two provisions are written in conflicting absolute terms. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 553, 1141 (1988).
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
119. 963 F.2d at 1276-77.
120. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 1141(d)(2)-(3) (1988).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2)-(3) (1988).
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (1988).
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so provides.'2 The Ninth Circuit overlooked this textual sup-
port for holding section 1141 superior to section 553 setoff
rights.
B. ERRONEOUS USE OF PRECEDENT
The Ninth Circuit cited only two Chapter 11 cases treating
the conflict between sections 553 and 1141. The court provided
no basis for distinguishing these cases from the DEG situation
other than to call one dictum and to note the limited discussion
of the issue in the other case. The Ninth Circuit thus did little
to explain or criticize the existing precedents under Chapter 11
which deal with sections 553 and 1141. Instead of offering some
analytical basis for distinguishing the cases, the Ninth Circuit
immediately turned to cases under analogous chapters of the
code to support its decision.
Several precedents under Chapter 11 support the denial of
setoff rights after confirmation of a reorganization plan. These
cases rely on the policies underlying sections 1141 and 524, and
the doctrine of res judicata. They hold that granting confirma-
tion and discharge superiority to setoff rights protects the inter-
ests of both the debtor and its creditors and effectuates the
policies behind the doctrine of res judicata. The Ninth Circuit
failed to explain why these policies do not control in the DEG
context.
Another Chapter 11 precedent relied on the absolute word-
ing of section 553 to uphold setoff even after confirmation.
Although the In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group court
did not cite this case, it advanced the same argument. Reliance
on the absolute wording of section 553 ignores the text of sec-
tion 524 which explicitly states that discharge prevents setoffs.
The court did cite several Chapter 13 cases holding that
creditors who fail to assert their setoff rights in a timely man-
ner at the confirmation hearing should not be able to jeopard-
ize the reorganization by subsequently asserting their setoffs.
After mentioning these cases, however, the court ignored them,
despite Chapter 13's similarity to Chapter 11. Structurally,
Chapter 13 closely resembles Chapter 11 because both involve
reorganization plans subject to confirmation, and both chapters
contain nearly identical language concerning the effect of con-
firmation. Despite the similarities between the two chapters,
the Ninth Circuit did nothing to distinguish or criticize the
124. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
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Chapter 13 precedents, and relied instead on less analogous
cases under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Ninth Circuit completely ignored any Chapter 12
precedents regarding conflicts between confirmation and setoff
rights. In the two existing Chapter 12 precedents on point, the
courts held that the failure to object to a plan at the confirma-
tion hearing precluded assertion of setoffs not included in the
reorganization plan. Chapter 12 precedents that addressed pro-
visions which closely tracked section 1141 and involved confir-
mation of a reorganization plan which discharged debts thus
provide additional support for granting section 1141 superiority
to section 553.
The Ninth Circuit's discussion of similar cases under Chap-
ter 7 was marred by its misconception of section 524 and its fail-
ure to consider the reasoning employed in those cases.-
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly noted that a majority of
courts hold that in the Chapter 7 context discharge does not
preclude later assertion of setoff rights, the court failed to ap-
preciate these courts' analysis. The courts in the Chapter 7
cases were concerned about the due process rights of creditors
who may lack notice and an opportunity to assert setoff rights
prior to discharge. This concern does not arise in the Chapter
11 context because a hearing is required when the reorganiza-
tion plan is put forth. Chapter 7 cases are distinguishable from
those arising in a Chapter 11 setting, and thus do not apply to
the kind of problem posed in In re De Laurentiis.
The Ninth Circuit also relied on cases under the analogous
provisions of the old Bankruptcy Act. While the legislative his-
tory of section 553 states an intent to preserve the right to set-
off as it previously existed, the Ninth Circuit's argument that
section 553 closely tracks the old Act is incorrect. 26 The anal-
ogy between section 1141 and the other confirmation provisions
in the Code is much closer than that in the Act.
C. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Ninth Circuit's argument that section 553 would be
rendered meaningless if subordinated to section 1141 is incor-
rect. The legislative history of section 553 illustrates that Con-
gress intended to include the doctrine of setoff within the new
125. The Ninth Circuit mistakenly placed all cases involving § 524 under
the Chapter 7 analogy, believing that § 524 only applied under Chapter 7.
126. Section 553 adopts an entirely different construction of setoff rights
than does § 68 of the old Bankruptcy Act.
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Bankruptcy Code. This purpose is achieved even if setoffs must
be included in reorganization plans prior to confirmation. Fur-
ther, section 553 provides useful restrictions on acquiring claims
for the purpose of setoff prior to bankruptcy.
The Ninth Circuit misstated traditional setoff doctrine in
bankruptcy when it argued that denying setoff after confirma-
tion would conflict with a bankruptcy policy in favor of setoff.
The Supreme Court has held that setoffs are disfavored in
bankruptcy. 27 The notion of setoff conflicts with the policy of
granting equal treatment to creditors because it allows the
creditor holding the setoff rights priority over other creditors.
The result benefits one creditor only at the expense of all
others. Thus, the court's concern to treat the individual credi-
tor equitably is inconsistent with general bankruptcy policy.
The Ninth Circuit's sympathy for NBC is also misplaced.
To argue that NBC diligently pursued its claim before the
bankruptcy court is to ignore NBC's silence in the confirmation
hearing despite its knowledge that the plan did not provide for
its setoff rights. The court also believed that NBC would be
unfairly denied its setoff right only because its quantum meruit
claim was not reduced to judgment prior to confirmation. This
need not have affected NBC, however, because NBC should
have objected to the confirmation of a plan that did not account
for its potential setoff. An objection based on the possibility of
setoff would have delayed confirmation until resolution of this
contingencym28
NBC's conduct also may be contrary to the policy underly-
ing the exceptions to section 553. These exceptions seek to pre-
vent creditors from manipulating claims so as to acquire setoff
rights that improve their positions with respect to other credi-
tors. That NBC brought a quantum meruit claim against DEG
rather than pursuing BBDO suggests that NBC manipulated
claims to achieve setoff. NBC probably did so to insure that the
advertising debt was paid ahead of other debts. Thus, fairness
to other creditors should have precluded NBC from exercising
setoff in this case.
Most importantly, the policy behind res judicata requires
confirmation and discharge to supersede setoff rights. Res judi-
127. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, 417 U.S. 467, 474 (1974).
128. See, e.g., In re Lund, 136 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990) (denying
confirmation of a plan which did not provide for the setoff of a debt even
though the amount of liability depended on resolution of exact contract
damages).
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cata policy insures fairness to parties who rely on a judgment
which was not directly appealed. Giving confirmation and dis-
charge their full res judicata effect yields fair treatment for all
parties involved. The many other creditors who do not hold
setoff rights can thereby make informed decisions about the re-
organization process and its effect on their operations, includ-
ing how they will vote on the reorganization plan.
The Ninth Circuit's ruling further undermines the essen-
tial purpose of Chapter 11. The reorganized debtor's search for
additional capital, vital to a successful reorganization, is ham-
pered if the confirmed plan is not given a full res judicata ef-
fect. Given the odds against a successful reorganization, to pose
yet another obstacle conflicts with the purpose of Chapter 11.
The only difficulty in granting confirmation primacy is the re-
quirement that a creditor who wishes to assert setoff rights do
so prior to confirmation. A bright line rule would protect the
rights of all involved, and realize Chapter 11's goal of allowing
struggling businesses to reorganize.
CONCLUSION
In In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group, the Ninth
Circuit held that creditors who did not object to the confirma-
tion of a Chapter 11 plan nonetheless could subsequently assert
setoff rights for which the plan did not provide. It determined
that the absolute language of section 553 setoff rights trumps
the absolute wording in the provisions of sections 1141 and 524
regarding confirmation and discharge. This ruling undermines
the ability of the reorganized debtor and other creditors to rely
on a final bankruptcy court judgment confirming the plan and
discharging the underlying debts, and runs counter to prece-
dent and bankruptcy policy. This Comment argues that bank-
ruptcy and res judicata policies require that sections 1141 and
524 should take precedence over section 553 setoff rights.
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